



Treaty Times

March 2002

Volume III

Captain's Corner



The Value of Exercises

Since becoming the Director of the Naval Treaty Implementation Program Office, I have been impressed with the genuine desire by everyone throughout the DON to take the business of arms control seriously and "train like we fight." From the highly successful U.S. – Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) challenge inspection exercise hosted last summer by Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head, Md. to the multitude of Open Skies Treaty training overflights that have occurred almost monthly during 2001, we collectively, from field commands and programs to Washington area support staffs, have continued to address these "training events" as the real thing. That's an approach that is often foreign to other federal entities, but one certainly well learned within the Navy and Marine Corps. One of my jobs is to represent the views of Navy and Marine Corps Commanders and Program Managers at the "implementers" table. This is the group of individuals responsible for developing implementation policy for the U.S. government.

Frequently, those representing the interests of other agencies may not be familiar with your requirements, obligations and responsibilities. Nevertheless, they will still be involved in decisions that may have a direct impact upon your ability to execute your responsibilities. Exercises afford us the opportunity to demonstrate to them the competing requirements that you have and how arms control verification events and activities affect

you and your responsibilities. Such was directly the case during the recent exercise at Indian Head. Observers from all other federal agencies involved in implementation policy development attended this exercise.

There were also representatives from six foreign countries. All of these individuals took away a better understanding of the Navy and Marine Corps methodology for conducting verification activities. This will give me the ability to more effectively represent your interests and to ease the burden of arms control verification activities, whether they are conducted in the U.S. or overseas.

With Open Skies Treaty entry-into-force (see related article), our time for practicing is over. It is now time to perform. As the direct result of our prior exercise overflights, notification training exercises, and extensive preparation, I have every confidence we will implement this treaty effectively without any significant adverse security effects upon your facilities.

Another one of my responsibilities is to ensure that those operators and program managers are informed about arms control-related matters. In this issue of Treaty Times you will find information designed to help you understand the impact of arms control current events on your mission. Some of these recent arms control events, such as the President's decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and entry-into-force of the Open Skies Treaty, have been quite dramatic. I hope you find this newsletter interesting and informative.

Go Navy!


Treaty on Open Skies

In the last newsletter we discussed the possibility of the Treaty on Open Skies entering-into-force at the beginning of 2002. Well, on 2 November 2001, Russia and Belarus deposited their instruments of ratification. The Treaty on Open Skies entered into force on 1 January 2002. During the first observation period (1 Jan

02 through 31 Dec 03), the US expects four flights over its territory. Upon full implementation, the US could receive up to 42 passive overflights per year, but the actual number of overflights is expected to be much lower.

In February, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) conducted a blue-on-blue Open Skies training session.

Blue-on-blue overflights are overflights conducted by the United States over the United States and will be conducted on a non-interference basis with operational activities. Blue-on-blues will be used to exercise the navy notification system. The latest blue-on-blue overflight occurred 18-22 February. We received a good response from our folks in the field. Keep up the great comms!



Congratulations to the **Top 10 Responders** for message 1, DTG 141840Z Feb 02.

NAVBASE VENTURA CTY PT MUGU
SUBASE NEW LONDON
NAVSURFWARCENDIV CRANE
COMNAVAIRWARCENACDIV PATUXENT
RIVER
WPNSTA CHARLESTON
COMNAVREGMIDLANT NORFOLK
SUBRON SUPPU NEW LONDON
COMSUBRON FOUR
COMSUBRON TWO
SUBRON DEVRON TWELVE

Remember, if your command is not on this list we do provide training.

We would like to give FACSAC Jacksonville a BRAVO ZULU for quickly bringing to our attention an issue that could cause confusion in the fleet.

For your use and reference NTIP will be adding two document templates to its website. One is an Open Skies Readiness Plan. This plan is intended to aid facilities in preparing local procedures for an overflight. It provides background on the treaty and the treaty timeline. It explains the messages that NTIP sends out, as well as providing checklists for actions to take before and during an overflight. Finally, it provides a checklist to assist in the preparation of the impact assessment required by the General Alert Message. The second document is a template for a Memorandum of Understanding. This template is intended to assist in formalizing Open Skies related procedures between a base and its tenant commands or between commands that share airspace, ranges, etc. See our web site, www.nawcwpns.navy.mil/~treaty/, for more information.

If you have any questions please call 202-764-0910 (DSN 764), or e-mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil.

Current Status of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty



President Bush announcing the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

On 13 December 2001, the United States provided diplomatic notes to the governments of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine officially declaring U.S. intent to

withdraw from the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (commonly referred to as the ABM Treaty) signed on 26 May 1972.

Under Article XV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, a Party has the right to withdraw from the Treaty "if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." Citing the direct threat to the security of the United States posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, particularly with regard to a number of state and non-state entities that have demonstrated their willingness to use such weapons against the United States, the United States exercised its right to withdraw. The Treaty requires that a Party give notice "six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty."

Having now provided a formal withdrawal notice, the United States is obligated under the ABM Treaty to continue to abide by its restrictions and limitations for the next six months. These restrictions include:

- the Article V prohibition against developing, testing, or deploying "ABM systems or components, which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based;" and
- the Article VI prohibition against giving "missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode."

The effective date of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has been defined as midnight, June 13, 2002. This means midnight LOCAL TIME, everywhere in the world. If you have any questions about an activity that may reasonably raise a treaty compliance issue before midnight in the last time zone before the International

Date Line, please call us. at 202-764-0910 (DSN 764), or e-mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil.

DON Challenge Inspection Methodology Validated by US/OPCW Exercise

This is the final in a series of articles on the DON support to DoD in the first joint U.S. – OPCW Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Mock Challenge Inspection (CI) Exercise held at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head Division, Indian Head, Maryland, last July. This unprecedented event provided the DON with valuable insights into the OPCW execution of a challenge inspection and inspectors' views and perspectives with respect to how they intend to accomplish their inspection mission. All participants, including the OPCW inspectors, shared lessons learned and gained insight to the challenges a site will encounter as they prepare to receive and facilitate inspection activities. The DON is evaluating a number of key lessons learned that came out of the post exercise briefings. A representative sample of the lessons learned are cooperation by the site is not measured by just meeting minimum treaty requirements; the inspection team expects to receive detailed facility information; i.e., maps, etc. at the point-of-entry (POE); the inspection team will probably request to secure the site as early as possible, even sending a sub-team to the site during POE activities; use of working-level sub-groups from both the site and inspection team to resolve issues; and educate them about the site and inspection plan development. One interesting observation made by the Inspection Team Leader (ITL) was acknowledging the tremendous logistical challenges posed to the site if the OPCW sent the expected number of 50 inspectors to conduct a challenge inspection at a facility the size of Indian Head.

Overall, DON remains confident that its Inspection Readiness Plans and challenge inspection methodology for an unprepared facility will be able to facilitate the inspection and meet its treaty obligations. These and other lessons learned will be incorporated as appropriate into the Navy's implementation procedures and future training and outreach seminars. If you have any questions please call 202-764-0910 (DSN 764), or e-mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil.

United States Reaches START Treaty Milestone

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was signed by the United States and the former Soviet Union on 31 July 1991 and entered into force on 5

December 1994. After the demise of the Soviet Union, a Protocol to the Treaty was signed in Lisbon, Portugal on 23 May 1992. The Protocol identified the four former Soviet Republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as START successor states to the Soviet Union. Today the four successor states and the United States remain the only parties to START.

One of the key provisions of START is a requirement that the signatories reduce the numbers of their strategic offensive arms to comply with the Treaty's central numerical limitations not later than seven years after entry-into-force. What is often referred to as the seven year "reductions period" came to a close at 2400 hours, 4 December 2001. To comply with the Treaty, the United States needed to reduce the number of accountable warheads on its deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers to no more than 6,000. Within the 6,000 number, no more than 4,900 warheads could be on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. As of 1 December 2001, the numbers of accountable warheads on United States systems were reported as 5,949 total warheads and 4,821 warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs.

To place the Treaty-imposed reductions in perspective, in September 1990 the United States (using START counting rules) possessed a total of 10,563 accountable warheads. Over 8,200 of those warheads were on ICBMs and SLBMs. At the same point in time, the Soviet Union had 10,271 deployed warheads, over 9,400 of which were deployed on ICBMs and SLBMs. Thus, implementation of START has resulted in a reduction of both total deployed strategic warheads and of ballistic missile warheads by over 40 percent from pre-Treaty levels.

The Navy made two major contributions to the United States' effort to comply with the START warhead limits. First, all but one of the ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of the Lafayette and Benjamin Franklin-classes have had their missile launchers eliminated using specific procedures contained in the Treaty's Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The final ship, the USS Kamehameha (SSBN 642), entered Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in late November 2001 to commence the elimination process. The United States retains a force of eighteen Ohio-class SSBNs, seven of which are currently armed with Trident I SLBMs and eleven with Trident II SLBMs. In the future, three of the remaining Trident I hulls will be converted to carry Trident II SLBMs while the other four may be reconfigured as cruise missile submarines (SSGNs).

The second major Navy action was to reduce the START warhead attribution of Trident I SLBMs from

eight warheads per missile to six. In late 2001 the United States formally notified the other START signatories that Trident I would henceforth be deployed with no more than six warheads. While reduced attribution, or “downloading,” is allowed by the Treaty, certain constraints are associated with the process. For example, Trident I SLBMs cannot be deployed or flight- tested with more than six warheads, the reattribution process cannot be reversed, and any new type of United States SLBM will be limited to carrying no more than six warheads. In addition, during periodic, short-notice reentry vehicle on-site inspections (RV OSI), foreign inspectors have the right to randomly select one missile aboard a submarine that is in port and, using mutually agreed procedures, confirm that the missile is not deployed with more than the attributed number of warheads. Trident II remains attributed with eight warheads per missile and the Trident II-equipped submarines are also subject to RV OSI.

During the seven years since START entered into force, the Navy has engaged in many other activities in support of the verification and reporting provisions of the Treaty. The Treaty provides for several different types of on-site inspections. To comply with Treaty requirements, the Navy has hosted foreign inspectors and their American escorts a total of 61 times at eleven different facilities. The facilities subject to START inspection are identified in the Treaty’s extensive data base and, to date, the list has been relatively static. The signatories also have the right to request to visit a facility that is not on the declared list, provided that they identify a particular compliance concern related to the facility in question. While the Treaty compels the United States to address the other signatory’s concern, there is no requirement to agree to the visit request.

In addition to hosting on-site inspections, the Navy has sent close to 600 formal notifications, as required by the Treaty. Examples of required notifications include advance notification of missile test flights, notification of the movement of SLBM first stages between facilities, and notifications associated with the elimination of SLBM launchers. The United States has also provided copies of missile flight test telemetry tapes after each of the 61 SLBM flight tests that have occurred since Treaty entry-into-force.

According to the provisions of the Treaty, START will remain in force until at least December 2009 and could be extended for a longer period. The Navy will continue to make every effort to ensure that all of its activities are compliant with the provisions of the Treaty. To that end, the Director, Strategic Systems Programs (DIRSSP) serves as the Navy’s Executive Agent for START implementation and compliance.

DIRSSP exercises this responsibility through his Technical Director (SP20), Technical Plans Officer (SP202) and Arms Control Coordinator (SP2023). Any individual or organization with a question or concern regarding Navy START requirements may call (202) 764-1555 or e-mail sp2023@sphq.ssp.navy.mil

Emergent Treaties

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCCW) and related issues

The 2001 CCCW Review Conference convened from 11-21 December 2001. A result of the conference was a decision by the States Parties to extend the scope of the CCCW to include internal/domestic-armed conflicts such as civil wars. The conference also addressed a number of other significant issues, including U.S. proposals to extend restrictions on anti-personnel landmines (APL) to include anti-vehicle landmines (AVL) and a proposed compliance mechanism for the convention. Conference participants agreed to form commissions and hold consultations in 2002 concerning these and other issues. The conference also invited states parties to convene expert groups to consider the issue of small caliber weapons and ammunition. States Parties will convene a meeting in December 2002 to review progress of the work agreed to at the Review Conference.

NTIP continues to work within the DoD and the Interagency to identify issues of concern regarding small arms and light weapons. The primary vehicle for this work is the DoD Small Arms/Light Weapons Implementation Working Group (SALWIWG). The SALWIWG is currently beginning preliminary preparation of the first data declaration required under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The OSCE Document requires States Parties, in the name of transparency, to annually provide information regarding small arms exports and imports among participating States, beginning this year. The reports are due in June for the previous calendar year, beginning in 2002.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Safeguards



Under the current U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the IAEA inspects four U.S. facilities: Hanford, WA; Rocky Flats, CO; Oak Ridge Y-12, TN; and BWXT Lynchburg, VA. During the heightened state of security in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, the U.S. suspended

all IAEA inspections pending a facility review to determine the adequacy of on-site security measures. After implementing more stringent security procedures at these facilities, inspections resumed in December 2001 (Hanford and Rocky Flats) and in January 2002 (Oak Ridge and BWXT). In light of the new heightened security environment, the Administration is reviewing the security implications of ratification of the Additional Protocol to the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

NTIP, through DoD and the Interagency, continues to take steps to prepare for the eventual entry-into-force of the Additional Protocol. Although the Administration has not transmitted the Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent for ratification, DoD has taken preliminary steps to begin drafting department-level implementation guidance. The forum for this work is a newly formed Cone Drafting Group (CDG) of the DoD Nuclear Safeguards Implementation Working Group (NS-IWG) Implementation Guidance Subgroup (IGS).

The CDG recently reviewed the U.S. Eligible Facilities List to determine if any changes were necessary in preparation for EIF of the Additional Protocol, particularly in light of the current heightened security environment. In drafting this implementation guidance, the CDG will also delineate DoD responsibilities regarding inspections under the Additional Protocol, as well as consideration of managed access, the national security exclusion, and other related issues.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

The CTBT calls for a Conference of State Parties on Facilitating the Entry-into-Force of the CTBT, every three years after its opening for signature. This Conference convened in December 2001. The U.S. did not dispatch a delegation to the conference due to the Administration's policy to not reconsider ratification of the treaty. Several State delegations expressed concern over the absence of the U.S. delegation. The Conference gave States the opportunity to review the progress towards entry-into-force and to consider ways the Treaty could be advanced.

If you have any questions please call 202-764-0910 (DSN 764), or by e-mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil.

The Legal Corner

The Arms Control Compliance Dance or Why Compliance Review of Programs is Necessary and Important

It's been a year now since the promulgation of the revised DOD Directive on implementation and compliance with arms control agreements (DOD Dir 2060.1, dtd January 9, 2001). That directive re-established DOD policy that "all DoD activities shall be fully compliant with arms control agreements of the U.S. Government." It further establishes procedures and mechanisms, such as Compliance Review Groups (CRG), to ensure compliance with our legal obligations. The fact that the Department takes these requirements seriously is no better demonstrated than the recent decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.



As you may recall, President Bush formally announced December 13 that the United States is withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. As provided in Article 15, the effective date of withdrawal is six months from that date. That decision was based in large part on our inability to go any further with a Navy program because of our legal commitments under the Treaty. It also is a good case study on how the arms control compliance process works when national security and treaty commitments collide.

In brief, the 1972 ABM Treaty, originally signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, prohibits the deployment of a national anti-ballistic missile system but did permit each side to deploy limited ABM systems at two locations (limited to only one site by agreement in 1974). The U.S. never fully deployed an ABM system, but Russia continues to maintain a limited ABM system located around Moscow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the treaty was re-signed by five successor states, with Russia still the primary party of concern. The Treaty specifically bans the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems and system components.

Importantly, the Treaty does not ban tactical or theater wide systems, and, based on that understanding with the Russians, the Navy was authorized to develop two classes of sea-based tactical theater-wide missile defense systems for use on Aegis ships. One is the Navy Area Defense missile system for defending against missiles within the earth's atmosphere, and the other is the Sea-based Midcourse Missile Defense system (formerly Navy Theater Wide), a system

designed to intercept medium- and intermediate-range theater ballistic missiles outside of the earth's atmosphere. Both these programs were certified by the CRG as fully compliant with the ABM Treaty. However, it was proposed to develop a sea-based national missile defense in which all Aegis cruisers would be equipped with a few interceptors capable of shooting down an ICBM. If developed this would violate the ABM Treaty.

Last year the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) proposed to use an Aegis SPY-1 radar (which is considered a component of a ballistic missile defense capability) to track a strategic ballistic missile target and to separately track a Titan II space launch vehicle. The test was designed to support development of a sea-based missile defense capability, including defense against SLBMs. The ABM Treaty CRG found that this test was inconsistent with our legal obligations under the Treaty. Based on that conclusion, on 24 September, the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) canceled the test and reported this to the Secretary of Defense.

At this point it was realized that we could not continue further development of sea-based National Missile Defense (NMD) programs without running afoul of our ABM Treaty obligations. Now, from a policy and political perspective a decision had to be made as to whether or not a sea-based NMD system was important enough to our national security to withdraw from the Treaty, which we had a legal right to do, or continue to abide by the Treaty and give up pursuing (and paying for) a sea-based NMD system. Given the continued and growing ballistic missile threat, the need to develop some sort of NMD system as quickly as possible, and the realization we could no longer develop or test a sea-based NMD system without running afoul of our compliance obligations, the President decided to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

There are two points worth contemplating in this case. First, the costs of non-compliance by going ahead with this test would have been very high. Both of our programs had been subjected to a thorough and continual compliance review since it was acknowledged that there would be compliance concerns as the capabilities of each system and its components were developed or tested in ways that could run afoul of the ABM Treaty. Clearly, at a certain point, we would eventually bump up against the prohibitions of the Treaty. The legal consequences of violating the Treaty are severe. Under the Article VIII of the Treaty "ABM systems and components prohibited by the Treaty" must be destroyed or dismantled. We did not want to "cross the line" and put at risk either the SPY-1 radar or our Aegis cruisers.

Second, the compliance review process provided decision-makers with the information necessary to make the policy decision on whether or not they wanted the Navy to expand the scope of its current missile defense systems beyond what would be permitted by the Treaty and U.S. law; specifically, whether to withdraw or modify the ABM Treaty to allow development and deployment of a sea-based national missile defense system or limit the programs to a theater or tactical capability only. Based on an assessment of national security needs, the President chose to continue development of this capability, and consequently, elected to withdraw from the Treaty.

There are some important lessons here worth noting. The compliance review process, particularly as developed for the Navy by SSP (NTIP), provides program managers with the analysis they need to certify that their program is consistent with our international and domestic legal obligations or to quickly identify potential issues of compliance concern. In the latter case, we work with the program manager to resolve those issues or identify at the earliest possible stage the policy choices that must be made and the legal steps necessary in order to continue the program. And, as this case proves, if there is a treaty issue that adversely affects the national security interests of the United States, the answer may likely be to change or withdraw from the treaty. The compliance review process works and we really are here to help! If you have any questions please call 202-764-0910 (DSN 764), or e-mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil.

Arms Control Treaty Compliance Review of DON Acquisition Programs

As a reminder *SECNAVINST 5710.23* requires that all emerging DON operational requirements are reviewed for arms control treaty compliance and implementation effects prior to a milestone 0/A decision and prior to all subsequent major milestones.

Cooperation from SYSCOMS and refinements to our process since the last issue of the Treaty Times has resulted in easier access to more accurate milestone decision dates and to requirements documentation, e.g., Mission Needs Statement (MNS) and/or Operational Requirements Documents (ORD). Many thanks to Director Denis Catalano and Dolly Hoffman in the NAVSEA Acquisition Support Office, Director Gerald Cecala, and Judy Hicks in the NAVAIR Acquisition Support Office, as well as CDR Uhl and Sharon Jones within OPNAV N810 for their assistance and support of the Naval Treaty Implementation Program's arms control treaty compliance review process.

We are currently exploring with the Requirements and Operations Branch (OPNAV 810) to include the NTIP Arms Control Treaty Compliance review in the MNS/ORD Review, Validation and Approval process. In doing so, we anticipate that acquisition managers will receive arms control treaty compliance certification of their programs or be made aware of any potential arms control treaty compliance concerns early in the process (prior to Milestone 0/A decisions) and have available to them the expertise needed to advise them of arms control treaty requirements as they relate to their program.

In the following months, we could see the expansion of our arms control treaty compliance reviews to research and development efforts, as well as increasing cooperation and coordination with our Sister services to ensure that joint programs receive a review of sufficient breadth to verify arms control treaty compliance.

The following DON acquisition programs have successfully completed arms control treaty compliance reviews since 1 Nov 2001:

PMA 208 AQM-37C Supersonic Target System

Target 21

PMA 290 EP-3E Communications Improvement

Program

PMA 282 Advanced Tomahawk Weapons Control System

Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System

PMA 251 MORIAH Wind System

M31 Marine Corps Expeditionary Arresting Gear

PMA 209 Advanced Mission Computer & Displays

PMA 260 Consolidated Automated Support System

PMA 258 Standoff Land Attack Missile - Expanded Response

PMA 263 Vertical Takeoff & Landing UAV

PMA 202 Joint Protective Aircrew Ensemble

Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System

PMS 529 Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM)

MK 45 5" Gun Extended Range MOD

PMS 473 Advanced Integrated EW System (AN/SLY-2)

PMS EOD Small Caliber Dearmer

Standoff Disrupter

EX 12 MOD 0 Acoustic Firing System

PMS210 Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep

PMS 440 AN/SPQ-9B Radar Improvement

AN/WQN-2 Doppler Sonar Velocity Log

PMS 465 Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)

PMS 377 LHA Replacement New Amphibious Warfare Capability

PMS 425 AN/BSY-1 High Freq. Upgrade Acoustic-Rapid COTS Insertion Phases I-III

PMS 403 MK-30 MOD2 ASW Training Target

PMW 173 Submarine High Data Rate

SEA05R1 Joint Chemical Agent Detector

Joint Biological Point Detection System

NSWCDD HYDRA Communications System

PEOTSC Land Attack Missile Weapon System

If you are a DON Program Manager with an acquisition program milestone decision upcoming, please contact the Review Coordinator for Arms Control Treaty Compliance, 202-764-0910 (DSN 764).

If you have any questions please call, or e-mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil

Fleet Liaison

Open Skies Training.

With Entry-Into-Force (EIF) and the start of a new year occurring simultaneously, we have been receiving requests for training. We are currently developing a training schedule for the year. Please contact our office if you wish to schedule




training for your activity/s.

As part of our out-reach program for Open Skies, NTIP developed and mailed out an Open Skies Entry-Into-Force package for all naval facilities and commands in the Open Skies database. If you have not received this package, please contact us so we can send one out to you. We are offering training for all personnel impacted by the Treaty; from those responsible for responding to Open Skies overflight notifications to those who make command impact assessments. Training can be provided to all hands including command duty officers, operations officers, range officers, program managers, and security personnel. There are also Train-the-Trainer sessions designed to provide the command with the in-house expertise to maintain Treaty awareness and train new personnel. Open Skies training can be brought to you in person or via video teleconferencing. Questions regarding Open Skies training should be directed to 202-764-0910 (DSN 764), or e-mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil.

Arms Control Seminars. All Navy and Marine Corps commands can benefit from an understanding of how arms control treaties and agreements may affect them. Each commander is responsible for compliance with all arms control treaties for his/her activity. NTIP is here to assist local commands in doing this. Arms Control Seminars are now being scheduled for 2002. These seminars are at no cost to your facility and can be planned at your convenience. If you are interested in

obtaining information about or scheduling a treaty awareness seminar for your command or region, please contact 202-764-0910 (DSN 764), or e-mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil.

Naval Treaty Implementation Program Website



The Naval Treaty Implementation Program (NTIP) website (<http://www.nawcwpns.navy.mil/~treaty>) serves as one of the Navy's primary sources of information on Arms Control. It features both brief and in-depth reports on a wide variety of dynamic treaties under the strategic, nuclear, conventional as well as chemical and biological agreements. NTIP clearly references SECNAV instructions relevant to arms control and provides contact information for the Program's office. This website can also be used to link the user to informative and reliable arms control related sites. The NTIP website is designed to help individuals better understand the global, national and personal impact of changes to U.S. strategic policy.

Further Reading



The Decline of Arms Control?

www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/02/arms.control/index.html

International tension followed U.S. decisions last month on international arms control agreements, including the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) made with the Soviet Union in 1972 and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

No Bush-Putin Agreement on ABM Treaty, Missile Defenses by Wade Boese

www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_12/misdefdec01.asp

During three days of mid-November talks held in Washington and Crawford, Texas, President George W. Bush failed to secure an agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin that would let the United States move forward with its missile defense plans without potentially violating the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

The START I Milestone: What Does it Mean to the United States? by Jon Wolfsthal

www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nukes.html

The United States and Russian Federation reached an important arms control milestone on December 5 when both sides completed reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals to 6,000 accountable warheads each, as required under the START I Treaty.

Websites



The appearance of hyperlinks in this newsletter does not constitute endorsement by the Department of the Navy (DON) of the web sites or the information, products or services contained therein and DON does not exercise any editorial control over the information you may find at these locations.

The Center for Defense Information

www.cdi.org

The Arms Control Association

www.armscontrol.org

The Washington Post

www.washingtonpost.com/

The Center for Defense Information

www.cdi.org

Acronym List

POE- Point of Entry

ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

NS-IWG – Nuclear Safeguards Implementation Working Group

OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

E-mail Addresses



In order to e-mail you and your command this newsletter and other pertinent information regarding treaty compliance and implementation, please e-mail our office with the following information:

- Command Name
- Official Command E-mail Address
- Commanding Officer Name
- Commanding Officer Phone Number
- Treaty Point-of-Contact (POC) Name
- POC Official Business E-mail Address
- POC Phone Number

You can also contact us at 301-744-4206, e-mail

TSOTreaty@ih.navy.mil.

Feedback



How are we doing? Is there something you would like to see in the next issue? We appreciate any comments or suggestions you may have. Please address all questions, comments, or concerns to:

E-Mail: ntip_treaty@ssp.navy.mil

Phone: 202-764-0910

DSN 764

Fax: 202-764-0918

Name and Address

Name	Naval Treaty Implementation Program
Command	Strategic Systems Programs
Address	ATTN: Naval Treaty Implementation Program (NT00) Nebraska Avenue Complex 287 Somers Court, NW Suite 10041 Washington, DC 20393-5446
Telephone	(202) 764-0910
DSN	764
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PLAD	NAVARMSCONTROLCOORD WASHINGTON DC
NTIP Website	http://www.nawcwpns.navy.mil/~treaty/